The Challenges of Korah: The Case for Civility in Contemporary Jewish Discourse

By Rabbi Alan Yuter
Posted Monday, July 3, 2006 • Modified Monday, July 10, 2006

When God gave the Torah to Moses, the Divine opinion, I suspect that what was written reflects the eternal divine perspective on reality, and not the contemporary search for justification driven search for proof texts. Biblical scholars distinguish between exegesis, or "reading out," of searching for the actual meaning of the sacred canonical texts. Modern scholars have come to realize that there is no absolutely "innocent reading," because every reading of necessity is the intersection of the reader and, in this case, the divine Writer. On the other hand, isogesis refers to "reading in," or allowing the text to be appropriated for contemporary use. Neither reading is fully objective, because no reading can happen if not processed by the reader. This notion finds it source in Kantian philosophy, which posits that nothing can be known with absolute objectivity as an unprocessed "thing in itself" because nothing can be known if not located in space, time, and its place in a causal chain of events, or "sufficient reason."

The Korah narrative has been taken by many Orthodox thinkers to refer to the non-Orthodox, which it regards as ignorant at best, and rebellious at worst. Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik's now famous talk, recorded in two recensions, by Epstein and Carmy and by Abraham Besdin, reveals a veiled but exquisitely tasteful critique of egalitarian Judaism. Korah's rebellion was one of "common sense," of a consensus of a community that invents social standards and does not submit to divine standards. The midrashic retellings of Korah, which have Korah asking "does a house full of books really require one little mezuzah," assuming that the quantity of Hebrew sacred letters reflects the purpose of the law, and "does a talleit that is entirely blue really require one single blue thread," assuming that the purpose of the law is the celebration of "blueness," The ancient rabbis are teaching that Korah appealed to populist sentiment. This insight was captured by Rabbi Soloveitchik. Korah's challenge to the leadership of Aaron and Moses is best understood by explicating Korah as an unreliable narrator. His challenge to God's appointed leaders reveals his own ambition and atheism: "the nation [Israel] is entirely holy, the Lord [resides] amongst them, why do you [Moses and Aaron] elevate yourselves over the Lord's sacred community?" [Numbers 16:3] Korah reveals in passing that he does not believe that God chose Moses and Aaron to lead. If Moses had his way, he would remain a shepherd in Moab and live out his years in peaceful tranquility. [Exodus 4:1-13] Yet Korah addresses Aaron and Moses assuming them to be usurpers and pretenders to authority. Because Korah cannot believe, he assumes that Moses and Aaron invented a religion to control the Israelites. As a self-appointed spokesman for the people, Korah would insinuate himself as the alternative, community responsive leadership. His "platform" is the egalitarian claim, the nation is entirely holy, the covenant allows no hierarchy of person, and the Lord is among the people—and not Moses or Aaron. Unstated but obvious to the reader is that Korah wishes to lord power over the people, and he assembles a congregaton "on" Moses and Aaron. By unpackaging the Korah narrative, Rabbi Soloveitchik's exegesis challenges the reader to beware that the egalitarian argument, that the common sense consensus of any given age does not necessarily reflect the divine logic of the Torah is an implicit critique of the egalitarianism of non-Orthodox leaders. But note well that as a scholar whose identity is revealed in their constant penchant for peace [bBerachot 84a], R. Soloveitchik address the object of the wrong that is committed, but does not challenge the person of the wrongdoer directly.

In his now famous essay, "Confrontation," R. Soloveitchik opposes religious dialogue with non-Jewish theologians, and he limits inter Jewish dialogue to matters of sociology and not religion. He distinguishes between the "covenant of Sinai," or Orthodox theology, and "the covenant of fate," which all Jews, Orthodox or not, share. While this distinction of "two covenants" is unattested in the canon accepted by Orthodoxy, the Korah narrative indicates that dialogue between Jews is not forbidden. [Numbers 16:8-12] The Torah has to inform the reader that Moses was angry [v. 15] because Moses kept his dignity without showing even a scintilla of anger. On one hand, like Moses, R. Soloveitchik keeps his dignity, even in reproof, but he argues that dialogue with religious deviants implies a willingness to compromise deeply head beliefs. Moses tried to engage Korah, but it Korah who denied the dialogue.

If one maintains that the intuition of the great sage is itself Torah, then R. Soloveitchik's policy has the status of Torah law. But just as in no place does the religious canon of Israel regard sagacious intuition. I suspect that R. Soloveitchik's ban is one of policy and not, strictly speaking, Torah law, because the canon of the Dual Torah does not seem to outlaw the practice. If it did, that source would have been cited. The Orthodox Jew submits to statutory law, but, on matters of policy, honest people may disagree.

Just as Moses did not show anger when sparring with Korah and R. Soloveitchik's attack on the egalitarian argument focused on the argument and was consciously not personal, current conflicts within Judaism must be undertaken with passion for one's position, but with respect and dignity. When Jewish egalitarians argue for pluralism on one hand, but argue that traditional Orthodox morality as defined by the canon is immoral, they are denying in practice what they proclaim in theory. What divides the Jewish community are different constructions of religious reality. Orthodoxy should realize that most Jews will not become Orthodox, and wants its opposition to keep within the "covenant of fate," or affirmative Jewish identity, to be successful. We must agree to allow the Jewishly committed "other" the right to be wrong. If we are successful in talking to one another, we won't attack each others. Peace will never be perfect, but the Hebrew word for peace implies wholeness. May we merit to develop the language of dialogue so that we understand our loyal opposition, so that we might heal the fissures in our Jewish world.

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